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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: CONTRACTS IN PERPETUUM

In 1905 the newly organized University of Florida was looking for a home. By statute1 the Board of Control was empowered to choose the site, and in so choosing, to take donations offered by municipalities wishing to be chosen. Through its "Citizen's Committee" (an unofficial body with no real authority)
the City of Gainesville, Florida, offered, in addition to substantial donations of buildings and lands, to furnish water to the
University free of charge. The offer was accepted; the University of Florida, with an enrollment of 135 students, set up
blackboards in Gainesville (population 3,633) ;2 and water began
flowing through University pipes.
The instant case3 was brought by the City of Gainesville, praying for a declaration of rights under the contract. In the interim
between the "donation" and the suit, enrollment of the University
had increased to 11,000 students.4 The City (population 26,861)1>
alleged it had floated revenue bonds for its present waterworks,
the revenue from the waterworks was insufficient to retire the
bonds, new facilities were needed, but new bonds could not be
sold under the present situation.
The City's contentions were: (1) the "Citizen's Committee"
had no authority to make the contract, and the contract, "ultra
vires" in its inception, could not be ratified by subsequent actions of the City; (2) the term of the contract being indefinite,
it was (a) void as against public policy as being "perpetual," or
(b) if construed as being for a "reasonable time," the "reasonable
time" had expired sometime during the past forty-five years;
!!G

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

Fla. Acts c. 538 (1905).
1 Census of Population: 1950, 10-8.
3 Gainesville v. Board of Control of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1955).
4 Id. at 516.
G 1 Census of Population:
1950, 10-8.
1

2
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and (3) the present size of the University was not contemplated
at the time the contract was made, and, as the contract places
an uncontemplated burden upon the City of considerable magnitude, the City should be relieved from the conti·act.
Held: Affirmed, the contract is enforceable. Assuming the
"Citizen's Committee" lacked the power to make the donation,
such a donation was within the proprietary power of the City,
and had been ratified by forty-five years of free water. Regarding the term of the contract, it is clear from the statute6 that the
City could, and did, contract for a term, not "perpetual" or "forever," but for "so long as the University remains in Gainesville." 7
As to the size of the University, and the burden upon the City,
the court reasoned that the larger the University, the more business and money accrued to the City.

May a municipal contract last forever? There is some authority for the proposition that the municipality, if properly authorized by statute, may make a "perpetual" contract. 8
Was Gainesville authorized to make such a contract? The
statute was by no means explicit that Gainesville could so contract.
In fact, the statute said nothing on this point.9 Nor did the city
charter. The court reasoned from the fact that (1) the Board
o Fla. .Acts c. 538 (1905).
1 "We take judicial notice of the location as permanent, but we do
not indulge the clairvoyance that it will be perpetual. Herculaneum and
Pompeii were permanent but history records that they were not perpetual.
We do not dare or wish to anticipate or apprehend that misfortune
or disaster will overtake either the University of Florida or the City of
Gainesville or that circumstances will bring about removal of the institution from its present site, but we do say that the physical situation
is not so inexorably fixed that the contract can be condemned as one to
last forever." Gainesville v. Board of Control of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514,
518 (Fla. 1955).
s 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 29.102 (3d ed. 1949); Borough
of Milltown v. City of New Brunswick, 138 N.J. Eq. 552, 49 .A.2d 234
(1946); Borough of Milltown v. City of New Brunswick, 46 .A.2d 562
(N.J. 1946); City of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 135 N.J.
Eq. 310, 38 .A.2d 288 ( 1944). .All three cases involved a contract between the Borough and the Town whereby the Town agreed to dispose of
the Borough's sewage. It was held in these cases that, as the statute
delegating to cities the power to contract contained no limitations as to
the length of time the contract might run, the contract was valid, although, by its terms, it might be perpetual. Des Moines v. West Des
Moines, 239 Iowa 1, 30 N.W.2d 500 (1948), holding a similar sewage
contract between two cities valid although, by its language, capable of
being perpetual in operation.
9 Fla. Rev. Stat. § 325 (1892).
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of Control was given power to "receive donations," and (2) another statute10 authorized the city of Tallahassee to guarantee to
the Board the payment of $2,000 per year "forever," to the conclusion that although Gainesville confessedly lacked express
power, it was clothed with the implied power to make an (almost) perpetual, donation-type contract.
Should such a power be implied?
As a legal matter, there is considerable authority for the
proposition that the giving of water, free of charge, is a legislative or governmental function of the city, and that a contract
whereby the city agrees to furnish water for an indefinite future time, or forever, is invalid as binding the legislative power
of subsequent councils.11 And as a practical matter this contract, while not "perpetual," will bind the City for a long, long
time.
10 Gainesville v. Board of Control of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514, 517 (Fla.
1955).
11 City Council of Augusta Y. Richmond County, 178 Ga. 400, 173 S.E.
140 (1934) (a contract whereby a municipality agreed to furnish water
for a courthouse and jail deeded by the municipality to the county was
ultra vires and not enforceable against subsequent councils); cf. Screws
v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 8 S.E.2d 16 (1940) (the power to fix
water rates is a governmental power, and a contract whereby the Council
agreed to furnish free water to the lessee of municipally owned fairgrounds for a period of twenty-five years was ultra vires and not binding
upon subsequent councils); Horkan v. Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561, 71 S.E.
785 (1911) (a city cannot contract to furnish free water to a private
person for an indefinite period even where consideration for the contract
is a sewer right-of-way over lands owned by the person, as power to
fix water rates is governmental in character and cannot be bargained
away, nor can contract be ratified, or city estopped to assert its invalidity);
Trustees of the Illinois Hospital for the Insane v. Jacksonville, 61 Ill.
•.\pp. 199 (1895) (a contract by the city to furnish water to the hospital at a fixed rate for ten years is not enforceable against the city because the power to , fix rates for water is a governmental function, and
one council cannot bind its successors with regard to legislative powers);
and see Commonwealth ex rel. Fortney v. Bartol, 342 Pa. 172, 20 A.2d
313 (1941) (holding a contract whereby the City agreed to make an annual appropriation of $3,000 to a Volunteer Fire Department invalid);
Robbins v. Boulder County, 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526 (19.10) (the power
to expend the County's money for future years being a governmental
function, the County could not accept a bequest of $50,000 from a Colorado decedent on condition that it agree to maintain a hospital for orphans and "old widow ladies" which was to be built with the $50,000);
State v. :Minnesota Transfer Ry., 80 Minn. 108, 83 N.W. 32 (1900) (an
agreement by a municipality to maintain forever a railroad bridge to be
built jointly by the railroad and the city was invalid); 10 McQuillin,
:Municipal Corporations §§ 29.101, 29.102 (3d ed. 1949).
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But it was on the basis of practical considerations that the
implied power was read into the statute. By the decision an impossible "reasonable time" question was avoided; similar suits
1·egarding donations were discouraged; and the State budget was
not confused. 12 And thus the drain on the Gainesville waterworks, and the City budget, was confirmed in perpetuity {almost).
William H. Sherwood, '56

12 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 282.01, item 62, footnote (1953), as cited by the
court: "*Provided that none of these monies shall be used to purchase
water from the City of Gainesville.'' Gainesville v. Board of Control of
Florida, 81 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla. 1955).

